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Abstract
We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion.
In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-
winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that
satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and
show that the fixed majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give
necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority crite-
rion. We find that, for most of the rules in our new class, the complexity of winner determination
is high (that is, the problem of computing the winners is NP-hard), but we also show examples
of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computa-
tionally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time
algorithms.
1 Introduction
The scoring rules in general, and Plurality specifically, are among the most often used and best
studied single-winner voting rules. Recently, multiwinner analogues of scoring rules—called com-
mittee scoring rules—were introduced by Elkind et al. [EFSS14], but our understanding of them is
so far quite limited. In this paper, we seek to somewhat rectify this situation by asking a seemingly
innocuous question: Among the committee scoring rules, which one is the analogue of Plurality?
(The single-winner Plurality rule elects the candidate who is listed as the most preferred one by
the largest number of voters.) Using an axiomatic approach, we find a rather surprising answer.
Not only is there a whole class of committee scoring rules that can be viewed as corresponding
∗Most of the work was done while the author was affiliated with TU Berlin (Berlin, Germany).
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to Plurality, but also one of the most ‘obvious’ candidates to be ‘the multiwinner Plurality’—the
single non-transferable vote rule (or SNTV, see the descriptions later)—falls short of satisfying our
criterion. On the other hand, it turns out that the Bloc rule is quite satisfying as ‘the multiwinner
Plurality.’ Yet, it certainly is not the only rule from our class and we believe that the other ones
deserve attention as well.
We complement our axiomatic study with an algorithmic analysis of this new class of committee
scoring rules. In particular, we show that it can be seen as a subfamily of the OWA-based rules1 of
Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15] (also studied by Aziz et al. [AGG+15, ABC+15]; see also
the work of Kilgour [Kil10] for a more general overview of approval-based multiwinner rules and
the work of Elkind and Ismaili [EI15] for a different OWA-based approach to multiwinner voting).
However, the hardness results for general OWA-based rules do not translate directly to our case
(and, indeed, some do not even hold).
Let us now describe our framework more precisely. In the multiwinner elections that we con-
sider, each voter ranks the candidates from the most desired one to the least desired one, and a voting
rule is used to pick a committee of a given size k that, in some sense, best reflects the voters’ prefer-
ences. Naturally, the exact meaning of the phrase ‘best reflects’ depends strongly on the application
at hand, as well as on the societal conventions and understanding of fairness. For example, if we are
to choose a size-k parliament, then it is important to guarantee proportional representation of certain
categories of the electorate (for example, political parties, ethnic or gender groups, etc.); if the goal
is to pick a group of products to offer to customers, then it might be important to maintain diversity
of the offer; if we are to shortlist a group of candidates for a job, then it is important to focus on
the quality of the selected candidates regardless of how similar some of them might be (see, for
example, the discussions provided by Lu and Boutilier [LB11, LB15], Elkind et al. [EFSS14], and
Skowron et al. [SFL15]).
In effect, there is quite a variety of multiwinner voting rules. For example, under SNTV, the
winning committee consists of k candidates who are ranked first more frequently than all the others;
under the Bloc rule, each voter gives one point to each candidate he or she ranks among his or her top
k positions, and the committee consists of k candidates with the most points; under the Chamberlin–
Courant rule, the winning committee consists of k candidates such that each voter ranks his or her
most preferred committee member as highly as possible (for the exact definition, we point the reader
to Section 2, to the original paper of Chamberlin and Courant [CC83], or to papers studying the
properties and the computational complexity of this rule [PRZ08, LB11, EFSS14, EI15, SFS15,
SF15]).
It turns out that the three rules mentioned above are examples of committee scoring rules, a class
of rules which generalize single-winner scoring rules to the multiwinner setting, recently introduced
by Elkind et al. [EFSS14] (see Section 2 for the definition).2 Of course, there are natural multiwinner
rules that cannot be expressed as committee scoring rules, such as the single transferable vote rule
(STV), the Monroe rule [Mon95], or all the multiwinner rules based on the Condorcet principle
(see, for example, the works of Elkind et al. [ELS11], Fishburn [Fis81], and Gehrlein [Geh85]).
Nonetheless, we believe that committee scoring rules form a very diverse class of voting rules that
1OWA stands for ordered weighted average.
2Naturally, these rules were known much before Elkind et al. [EFSS14] introduced the unifying framework for them.
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deserves a further study.
In this paper, we analyze committee scoring rules in our search of a ‘multiwinner analogue’ of
the (single-winner) Plurality rule. Intuitively, it might seem that SNTV, which picks k candidates
with best Plurality scores, is such a rule, thus rendering this question trivial. However, instead of
following this intuition we take an axiomatic approach. We note that Plurality is the only single-
winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority3 criterion, which stipulates that a candidate
ranked first by more than half of all voters must be a unique winner of the election. We ask for
a committee scoring rule that satisfies the fixed-majority criterion, a multiwinner analogue of the
simple majority criterion introduced by Debord [Deb93]. It requires that if there is a simple majority
of the voters, each of whom ranks the same k candidates in their top k positions (perhaps in a
different order), then these k candidates should form a unique winning committee.
With a moment of thought, one can verify that the Bloc rule satisfies the fixed-majority criterion.
It turns out, however, that Bloc is by far not the only committee scoring rule having this property,
and that there is a whole class of them. We provide an (almost) full characterization of this class4 and
analyze the computational complexity of winner determination for the rules in this class. Initially, we
identify a somewhat larger class (in terms of strict containment) of top-k-counting rules for which
the score that a committee receives from a given voter is a function of the number of committee
members that this voter ranks in the top k positions (recall that k is the committee size); we refer to
this function as the counting function. We obtain the following main results:
1. We prove that all committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion are top-k-
counting rules. We establish conditions on the counting function that are necessary and suffi-
cient for the corresponding top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. These
conditions are a fairly mild relaxation of convexity. In particular, if the counting function is
convex, then the corresponding top-k-counting rule satisfies the fixed-majority criterion.
2. For a large class of counting functions, top-k-counting rules are NP-hard to compute (for
example, we show an example of a rule that closely resembles the Bloc rule and is hard even
to approximate). There are, however, some polynomial-time computable ones (for example,
the Bloc and Perfectionist rules; where the latter one is introduced in this paper).
3. If the counting function is concave, then the rule it defines fails the fixed-majority criterion,
but the rule seems to be easier computationally than in the convex case. For this case, we
show a polynomial-time (1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm as well as show fixed-parameter
tractability with respect to the number of voters for the problem of finding the winning com-
mittee.
All in all, we find that there is no single multiwinner analogue of Plurality, even if we restrict
ourselves to polynomial-time computable committee scoring rules. Indeed, on the intuitive level
3In the literature, simple majority is often referred to as majority. However, we write ‘simple majority’ to clearly
distinguish it from qualified majority and from fixed-majority.
4For technical reasons, we consider the case where there are at least twice as many candidates as the size of the
committee (that is, m ≥ 2k).
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SNTV is such a rule, and through our axiomatic consideration we show that Bloc and Perfectionist
are also good candidates.
Before we move on to the technical content of the paper, let us take a step back and answer one
principal question: why did we look for the multiwinner analogue of Plurality? We believe that this
quest deserves attention for the following two main reasons.
1. Until recently, multiwinner voting received only passing attention in the computational social
choice literature, and it is still receiving only moderate attention in the social choice litera-
ture. In effect, our understanding of multiwinner voting is currently limited. Since Plurality
is among the most basic, best-known rules, asking for its generalization to the multiwinner
setting is a natural, fundamental issue.
2. There is a growing number of applications of multiwinner rules, many of which are much
closer to the worlds of artificial intelligence, multiagent systems, and business, than to the
world of politics. For example, Lu and Boutilier [LB11, LB15] discuss several applications
pertaining to business settings, for example, how a company can decide which set of items
to advertise to their clients if the total number of items that they may advertise is limited.
Skowron [Sko15] studies applicability of various multiwinner rules to running different types
of indirect elections. Elkind et al. [EFSS14] and Skowron et al. [SFL15] discuss further ap-
plications, ranging from shortlisting candidates through various types of resource allocation
tasks to choosing committees of representatives such as parliaments.
For the above two reasons, we believe that it is important to understand fundamental properties of
various (families of) multiwinner rules. In this paper we explore and study one such fundamental
property and the corresponding family of rules.
2 Preliminaries
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and V =
(v1, . . . , vn) is a collection of voters. Throughout the paper, we reserve the symbol m to denote
the number of candidates. Each voter vi is associated with a preference order ≻i in which vi ranks
the candidates from his or her most desirable one to his or her least desirable one. If X and Y are
two (disjoint) subsets of C , then by X ≻i Y we mean that for each x ∈ X and each y ∈ Y it holds
that x ≻i y. For a positive integer t, we denote the set {1, . . . , t} by [t].
Single-Winner Voting Rules. A single-winner voting rule R is a function that, given an election
E = (C, V ), outputs a subset R(E) of candidates that are called (tied) winners of this election.
There is quite a variety of single-winner voting rules, but in this paper it suffices to consider scoring
rules only. Given a voter v and a candidate c, we write posv(c) to denote the position of c in v’s
preference order (for example, if v ranks c first then posv(c) = 1). A scoring function for m
candidates is a function γm : [m]→ N such that for each i ∈ [m− 1] we have γm(i) ≥ γm(i+ 1).
Each family of scoring functions γ = (γm)m∈N (one function for each possible choice ofm) defines
a voting rule Rγ as follows. Let E = (C, V ) be an election with m candidates. Under Rγ , each
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candidate c ∈ C receives score(c) :=
∑
v∈V γm(posv(c)) points and the candidate with the highest
number of points wins. (If there are several such candidates, then they all tie as winners.) We often
refer to the value score(c) as the γ-score of c.
The following scoring functions and scoring rules are particularly interesting. The t-approval
scoring function αt is defined as αt(i) := 1 for i ≤ t and αt(i) := 0 otherwise. (If t is fixed,
then the definition of αt does not depend on m. In such cases αt can both be viewed as a scoring
function and as a family of scoring functions.) For example, Plurality is Rα1 , the t-Approval rule
is Rαt , and the Veto rule is R(αm−1)m∈N . The Borda scoring function (for m candidates), βm, is
defined as βm(i) := m− i, and Rβ is the Borda rule, where β = (βm)m∈N.
Multiwinner Voting Rules. A multiwinner voting rule R is a function that, given an election
E = (C, V ) and a number k representing the size of the desired committee, outputs a family
R(E, k) of size-k subsets of C . The sets in this family are the committees that tie as winners. As
in the case of single-winner voting rules, one may need a tie-breaking rule to get a unique winning
committee, but we ignore this aspect in the current paper.
We focus on the committee scoring rules, introduced by Elkind et al. [EFSS14]. Consider an
election E = (C, V ) and some committee S of a given size k. Let v be some voter in V . By posv(S)
we mean the sequence (i1, . . . , ik) that results from sorting the set {posv(c) : c ∈ S} in increasing
order. For example, if C = {a, b, c, d, e}, the preference order of v is a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e, and
S = {a, c, d}, then posv(S) = (1, 3, 4). If I = (i1, . . . , ik) and J = (j1, . . . , jk) are two increasing
sequences of integers, then we say that I (weakly) dominates J (denoted I  J) if it ≤ jt for each
t ∈ [k]. For positive integers m and k, k ≤ m, by [m]k we mean the set of all increasing size-k
sequences of integers from [m].
Definition 1. [Elkind et al. [EFSS14]] A committee scoring function for a multiwinner election with
m candidates, where we seek a committee of size k, is a function fm,k : [m]k → N such that for
each two sequences I, J ∈ [m]k it holds that if I  J then f(I) ≥ f(J).
Intuitively, the function fm,k from Definition 1 assigns to each sequence I of k positions the
number of points that a committee C gets from a voter v when the members of C stand on positions
from I in the preference order of v.
A committee scoring rule is defined by a family of committee scoring functions f = (fm,k)k≤m,
one function for each possible choice of m and k. Analogously to the case of single-winner scoring
rules, we will denote such a multiwinner rule by Rf . Let E = (C, V ) be an election with m
candidates, let k, k ≤ m, be the size of the desired committee. Under the committee scoring rule
Rf , every committee S ⊆ C with |S| = k receives score(S) :=
∑
v∈V fm,k(posv(S)) points (for
this notation, the election E = (C, V ) will always be clear from the context). The committee with
the highest score wins. (If there are several such committees, then they all tie as winners.)
Many well-known multiwinner voting rules are, in fact, families of committee scoring rules.
Consider the following examples:
1. SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda rules pick k candidates with the highest Plurality, k-Approval, and
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Borda scores, respectively. Thus, they are defined through the following scoring functions:
fSNTVm,k (i1, . . . , ik) :=
∑k
t=1 α1(it) = α1(i1),
fBlocm,k (i1, . . . , ik) :=
∑k
t=1 αk(it),
fk-Bordam,k (i1, . . . , ik) :=
∑k
t=1 βm(it),
respectively. Note that fSNTVm,k is defined as a sum of functions that do not depend on either
m or k, fBlocm,k is defined as a sum of functions that depend on k but not m, and fk-Bordam,k is
defined as a sum of functions that depend on m but not k.
2. The two versions of the Chamberlin–Courant rule that we consider are defined through the
committee scoring functions:
fβ-CCm,k (i1, . . . , ik) := βm(i1),
fαk-CCm,k (i1, . . . , ik) := αk(i1),
respectively. The first one defines the classical Chamberlin-Courant rule [CC83] and the sec-
ond one defines what we refer to as k-Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule (approval-based
variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule were introduced by Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zo-
har [PRZ08], and were later studied, for example, by Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlman [BSU13],
Aziz et al. [ABC+15] and Skowron and Faliszewski [SF15]). For brevity, we sometimes refer
to k-Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule as the αk-CC rule.
Intuitively, under the Chamberlin–Courant rules, each voter is represented by the committee
member that this voter ranks highest; the Chamberlin–Courant rule chooses a committee C
that maximizes the sum of the scores that the voters give to their representatives in C (which
characterizes the total satisfaction of the society with the assignment of representatives to
voters).
In the next example we show the differences between the above rules. Since these rules are
designed to satisfy different desiderata, it turns out that on the same election they may provide
significantly different outcomes.
Example 1. Let us consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h} and eight voters with
the following preference orders:
v1 : a ≻ f ≻ c ≻ g ≻ h ≻ e ≻ b ≻ d, v2 : c ≻ e ≻ g ≻ h ≻ a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ d,
v3 : a ≻ f ≻ c ≻ h ≻ g ≻ e ≻ b ≻ d, v4 : d ≻ e ≻ h ≻ g ≻ a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ c,
v5 : b ≻ c ≻ g ≻ h ≻ a ≻ e ≻ f ≻ d, v6 : e ≻ g ≻ d ≻ h ≻ a ≻ b ≻ f ≻ c,
v7 : b ≻ d ≻ h ≻ g ≻ a ≻ e ≻ f ≻ c, v8 : f ≻ h ≻ d ≻ g ≻ a ≻ b ≻ e ≻ c.
Let the committee size k be 2. It is easy to compute the winners under the SNTV and Bloc rules.
For the former, the unique winning committee is {a, b} (these are the only two candidates that are
ranked in the top positions twice, and for the latter it is {e, f} (these are the only two candidates
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that are ranked among top two positions three times; all the other candidates are ranked there at
most twice). A somewhat tedious calculation shows that the unique k-Borda winning committee is
{g, h}. (The Borda scores of the candidates a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h are, respectively:
32, 22, 23, 23, 28, 26, 35, 35.
Finally, further calculations show that, under the (classical) Chamberlin–Courant rule, the unique
winning committee is {c, d}. (While it is tedious to compute these results by hand, and indeed we
used a computer to find them, the intuition for the k-Borda and Chamberlin–Courant winners is as
follows: g and h are always ranked in the middle of each vote, or slightly above, so that they get
high total Borda score, whereas c and d are ranked so that one of them is (almost) always ahead of
g and h, whereas the other is in the last position. This way, as representatives, c and d get higher
scores than g and h, even though their total Borda score is lower.) Finally, it is relatively easy to
verify that under αk-CC, the winning committee is {e, f} (its αk-CC score is six; there is no other
committee whose members are ranked among top two positions of six or more voters).
Following the nomenclature of Elkind et al. [EFSS14], we say that a committee scoring rule Rf
defined by the family f = (fm,k)k≤m of committee scoring functions is weakly separable if there
exists a family (γm,k)k≤m of single-winner scoring functions, γm,k : [m]k → N such that:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) =
k∑
t=1
γm,k(it).
Intuitively, under a weakly separable rule, we can compute the scores of all candidates separately
and the rule picks up the k candidates with the highest scores. Rf is called separable if for fixed
m the function γm,k does not depend on k. We see that SNTV and k-Borda are separable, that
Bloc is only weakly separable, and that neither of our two versions of the Chamberlin-Courant
rule is weakly separable. Elkind et al. [EFSS14] show that separable rules have somewhat different
properties than weakly separable ones.
Our two variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule are what Elkind et al. [EFSS14] call repre-
sentation focused rules. A committee scoring rule Rf , defined through a family f = (fm,k)k≤m
of committee scoring functions, is representation focused if there exists a family of single-winner
scoring functions γ = (γm,k)k≤m such that:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = γm,k(i1).
Both Chamberlin–Courant and αk-CC are representation-focused, but, somewhat surprisingly, so is
SNTV.
The above two classes of rules (weakly separable ones and representation-focused ones) can
be further generalized. Recently, Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15] introduced a new class
of multiwinner rules based on OWA operators5 (a variant of this class was also studied by Aziz et
5OWA stands for “ordered weighted average”. OWA operators were introduced by Yager [Yag88] in the context of
multicriteria decision making. Kacprzyk et al. [KNZ11] describe their applications in the context of collective choice.
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al. [ABC+15, AGG+15]; Elkind and Ismaili [EI15] consider a different family of multiwinner rules
defined through OWA operators as well). While they did not directly consider elections based on
preference orders, we can apply their main ideas to committee scoring rules.
An OWA operator Λ of dimension k is a sequence Λ = (λ1, . . . , λk) of nonnegative reals.6
Definition 2. Let Λ = (Λm,k)k≤m be a family of OWA operators such that Λm,k = (λ1m,k,
. . . , λkm,k) has dimension k (one size-k vector for each pair m,k). Let γ = (γm,k)k≤m be a
family of (single-winner) scoring function (one scoring function for each pair m,k). Then γ to-
gether with Λ define a family of committee scoring functions f = fm,k(Λ, γ) such that for each
(i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [mk] we have:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) =
k∑
t=1
λtm,kγm,k(it).
The committee scoring rule Rf corresponding to the family f is called OWA-based.
Intuitively, the OWA operators specify to what extent the voters care about each member of the
committee, depending how this member is ranked among the other ones. Indeed, every weakly sepa-
rable rule is OWA-based with OWA operators of the form (1, . . . , 1), which means that under weakly
separable rules the voters care about all the committee members equally. Representation-focused
rules are OWA-based through OWA operators of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0), which intuitively means
that the voters care about their top-ranked committee members only. Another interesting group of
OWA-based committee scoring rules is defined through OWA operators of the form (1, 12 , . . . ,
1
k
)
and the t-Approval scoring functions (for some choice of t). We refer to these rules as αt-PAV
(in essence, these are variants of the Proportional Approval Voting rule, cast into the framework
of committee scoring rules by assuming that every voter approves exactly his or her top t can-
didates). Intuitively, such OWA operators indicate the decreasing attention the voters pay to their
lower ranked committee members. For more discussion of the OWA-based rules, we refer the reader
to the works of Skowron et al. [SFL15] and Aziz et al. [ABC+15, AGG+15] (the latter ones include
a more detailed discussion of PAV; see also the work of Kilgour [Kil10] for a description of this
rule).
Remark 1. We note that in most cases the OWA vectors Λm,k used to define OWA-based rules do not
depend on m. Yet, formally, we allow for such a dependency in order to build the relation between
our general framework in which committee scoring functions fm,k might depend on m in any, even
not very intuitive, way, and the world of OWA-based rules.
3 Fixed-Majority Consistent Rules
We now start our quest for finding committee scoring rules that can be seen as multiwinner ana-
logues of Plurality. We begin by describing the fixed-majority criterion that, in our view, encapsu-
lates the idea of closeness to Plurality. Then, we provide a class of committee scoring rules—the
6We slightly generalize the notion and, unlike Yager [Yag88], we do not require that λ1 + . . .+ λk = 1.
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top-k-counting rules—that contains all the rules which satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. Finally,
we provide a complete characterization of fixed-majority voting rules within the class of top-k-
counting voting rules.
3.1 Initial Remarks
One of the features that distinguishes Plurality among all other scoring rules is the fact that it satisfies
the simple majority criterion.
Definition 3. A single-winner voting rule R satisfies the simple majority criterion if, for every
election E = (C, V ) where more than half of the voters rank some candidate c first, it holds that
R(E) = {c}.
Importantly, the simple majority criterion characterizes Plurality within the class of single-
winner scoring rules. The result is a part of folklore (we provide the proof for the sake of com-
pleteness).
Proposition 1. Let γ = (γm)m∈N be a family of single-winner scoring functions, such that the
scoring rule Rγ satisfies the simple majority criterion. Then for each m it holds that γm(1) >
γm(2) = · · · = γm(m), and thus Rγ coincides with Plurality.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if for each m we have γm(1) > γm(2) = · · · = γm(m)
then Rγ satisfies the simple majority criterion. For the other direction, assume that Rγ satisfies the
simple majority criterion. This immediately implies that for each m ≥ 2 we have γm(1) > γm(m)
(otherwise all the candidates would always tie as winners). Hence for m = 2 the result follows.
Let us fix m ≥ 3. For each positive integer n, define the election En = (C, Vn) with the
candidate set C = {c1, . . . , cm} and with Vn containing:
n+ 1 voters with preference order c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm, and
n voters with preference order c2 ≻ c3 ≻ · · · ≻ cm ≻ c1.
Since Rγ satisfies the simple majority criterion, it must be the case that c1 is the unique Rγ-winner
for each En. Further, for a given value of n, the difference between the scores of c1 and c2 in En is:
score(c1)− score(c2) =
(
(n+ 1)γm(1) + nγm(m)
)
−
(
(n+ 1)γm(2) + nγm(1)
)
= γm(1)− γm(2) + n
(
γm(m)− γm(2)
)
.
Thus, if it held that γm(2) > γm(m), then—for large enough value of n—candidate c1 would not
be a winner of En. This implies that γm(2) = · · · = γm(m). Since γm(1) > γm(m), we reach the
conclusion that γm(1) > γm(2) = · · · = γm(m).
There are at least two ways of generalizing the simple majority criterion to the multiwin-
ner setting. We choose perhaps the simplest one, the fixed-majority criterion introduced by De-
bord [Deb93] (other notions of majority studied by Debord are variants of the Condorcet principle
and are incompatible with Plurality and scoring rules in general).
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Definition 4. A multiwinner voting rule R satisfies the fixed-majority criterion for m candidates
and committee size k if, for every election E = (C, V ) with m candidates, the following holds: if
there is a committee W of size k such that more than half of the voters rank all the members of
W above the non-members of W , then R(E, k) = {W}. We say that R satisfies the fixed-majority
criterion if it satisfies it for all choices of m and k (with k ≤ m).
Remark 2. Another way of extending the simple majority criterion to the multiwinner case would
be to say that, if a committee W is such that for each c ∈ W a majority of voters rank c among
their top k positions (possibly a different majority for each c), then W must be a winning committee.
However, consider the following votes over the candidate set {a, b, c}:
v1 : a > b > c, v2 : a > c > b, v3 : b > c > a.
For k = 2, all three committees, {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c}, have majority support in the sense just
described. We feel that this is against the spirit of the simple majority criterion. Thus, and since
we have not found any other convincing ways of generalizing the simple majority criterion to the
multiwinner setting, we focus on Debord’s fixed-majority notion.
One can verify that the Bloc rule satisfies the fixed-majority criterion and that SNTV does not
(it will also follow formally from our further discussion). This means that in the axiomatic sense,
Bloc is closer to Plurality than SNTV. This is quite interesting since one’s first idea of generalizing
Plurality would likely be to think of SNTV. Yet, Bloc is certainly not the only committee scoring
rule that satisfies our criterion. Let us consider the following rule.
Definition 5. Let k be the size of committee to be elected. The Perfectionist rule is defined through
the family f of scoring function fm,k such that fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = 1, if (i1, . . . , ik) = (1, . . . , k),
and fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = 0, otherwise. In other words, a voter gives score of 1 to a committee only if
its members occupy the top k positions of his or her vote.
Alternatively, the Perfectionist rule can be viewed as an OWA-based rule defined by the family
Λ = (Λm,k)k≤m of OWA operators, where Λm,k = (0, 0, . . . , 1), and the family of k-Approval
scoring function γm,k = αk.
Example 2. Let us, once again, consider the election from Example 1. In this election, for the
committee size k = 2, Perfectionist assigns two points to committee {a, f}, one point to each of
{b, c}, {b, d}, {c, e}, {d, e}, {e, g}, and {f, h}, and zero points to all the other committees. Thus,
{a, f} is the unique winning committee.
We note that Perfectionist satisfies the fixed-majority criterion and that it closely resembles
Plurality. The following remark strongly highlights this similarity.
Remark 3. Consider a situation where the voters extend their rankings of candidates to rankings
of committees in some natural way. Then, for each voter, the best committee would consist of his
or her k best candidates. As a result, running Plurality on the profile of preferences over the com-
mittees would give the same result as running Perfectionist over the profile of preferences over the
candidates.
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Naturally, not all committee scoring rules satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. For example, nei-
ther k-Borda nor the Chamberlin–Courant rule do. To see this, it suffices to note that for k = 1 they
both become the single-winner Borda rule, which fails the simple majority criterion.
In what follows, we will be interested in knowing which committee scoring rules do satisfy the
fixed majority criterion and which do not.
3.2 Top-k-Counting Rules
To characterize the committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion, we introduce a
class of scoring functions that depend only on the number of committee members ranked in the top
k positions.
Definition 6. We say that a committee scoring function fm,k : [m]k → N, is top-k-counting if there
is a function gm,k : {0, . . . , k} → N such that gm,k(0) = 0 and for each (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [m]k we have
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = gm,k(|{t ∈ [k] : it ≤ k}|). We refer to gm,k as the counting function for fm,k.
We say that a committee scoring rule Rf is top-k-counting if it can be defined through a family of
top-k-counting scoring functions f = (fm,k)k≤m.
Both Bloc and Perfectionist are top-k-counting rules. The former uses the linear counting
function gm,k(x) = x, while the latter uses the counting function gm,k which is a step-function:
gm,k(x) = 0 for x < k and gm,k(k) = 1. Another example of a top-k-counting rule is the αk-CC
rule, which uses the counting function gm,k such that gm,k(0) = 0 and gm,k(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [k].
Top-k-counting rules have a number of interesting features. First, their counting functions have
to be nondecreasing. Second, every top-k-counting rule is OWA-based. Third, every committee
scoring rule that satisfies the fixed-majority criterion is top-k-counting. We express these facts in
the following two propositions and in Theorem 4. For the rest of the paper we make the assumption
that m ≥ 2k; this assumption is mostly technical as our arguments are greatly simplified by the fact
that we can form two disjoint committees of size k. Further, it is also quite natural: one could say
that if we were to choose a committee consisting of more than half of the candidates, then perhaps
we should rather be voting for who should not be in the elected committee.
Proposition 2. Let m ≥ 2k and let fm,k : [m]k → N be a top-k-counting scoring function defined
through a counting function gm,k. Then, gm,k is nondecreasing.
Proof. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Consider the sequences It = (1, . . . , t, k + 1, . . . , k + (k − t)) and
It+1 = (1, . . . , t+1, k+1, . . . , k+(k− t−1)) from [m]k. (Note that we need m ≥ 2k for defining
I0.) Since It+1  It, we have that fm,k(It+1) ≥ fm,k(It). By the definition, however, we have that
fm,k(It+1) = gm,k(t+ 1) and fm,k(It) = gm,k(t). Hence, gm,k(t+ 1) ≥ gm,k(t).
Without the assumption that m ≥ 2k, Proposition 2 would have to be phrased more cautiously,
and would speak only of the existence of nondecreasing counting function. (For example, for m =
k, the function gm,k could be arbitrary.)
Proposition 3. Every top-k-counting rule is OWA-based.
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Proof. Let us consider a top-k-counting ruleRf , where f = (fm,k)k≤m is the corresponding family
of top-k-counting functions defined by a family of counting functions (gm,k)k≤m. Let us consider
one function fm,k from this family. We know that fm,k : [m]k → N is a top-k-counting scoring
function defined through a counting function gm,k so that fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = gm,k(s), where s =
|{t ∈ [k] : it ≤ k}|. As gm,k(0) = 0, we have
fm,k(i1, . . . ik) = gm,k(s)− gm,k(0) =
∑s
t=1(gm,k(t)− gm,k(t− 1))
=
∑k
t=1 αk(it) · (gm,k(t)− gm,k(t− 1)),
from which we see that Rf is OWA-based through the family of OWA operators:
Λm,k = (gm,k(1) − gm,k(0), gm,k(2) − gm,k(1), . . . , gm,k(k)− gm,k(k − 1)),
and the family of k-Approval scoring functions (γm,k = αk).
In the next theorem (and in many further theorems) we speak of a committee scoring rule Rf
defined through a family of committee scoring functions f = (fm,k)2k≤m. We use this notation as
a shorthand for the assumption that the theorem is restricted to the cases where 2k ≤ m.
Theorem 4. Let f = (fm,k)2k≤m be a family of committee scoring functions. If Rf satisfies the
fixed-majority criterion, then Rf is top-k-counting.
Proof. Let us fix two numbers m and k such that 2k ≤ m. Consider an election with m candidates,
where a committee of size k is to be elected. For each positive integer t such that 0 ≤ t ≤ k we
define the following two sequences from [m]k:
1. It = (1, . . . , t, k+1, . . . , k+k−t) is a sequence of positions of the candidates where the first
t candidates are ranked in the top t positions and the remaining k − t candidates are ranked
just below the kth position.
2. Jt = (k− (t− 1), . . . , k,m− ((k− t)− 1), . . . ,m) is a sequence of positions where the first
t candidates are ranked just above (and including) the kth position, whereas the remaining
k − t candidates are ranked at the bottom.
Among these, Ik = (1, . . . , k) is the highest-scoring sequence of positions and Jk = (m − (k −
1), . . . ,m) is the lowest-scoring sequence. Further, for every t we have It  Jt and, in effect,
fm,k(It) ≥ fm,k(Jt).
We claim that if there exists some t ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that fm,k(It) > fm,k(Jt) then Rf does
not have the fixed-majority property. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is some t such
that fm,k(It) > fm,k(Jt). Let E = (C, V ) be an election with m candidates and 2n + 1 voters.
The set of candidates is C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ D, where X = {x1, . . . , xt}, Y = {yt+1, . . . , yk},
Z = {zt+1, . . . , zk}, and D is a set of sufficiently many dummy candidates so that |C| = m. We
focus on two committees, M = X ∪ Y and N = X ∪ Z . The first n + 1 voters have preference
order X ≻ Y ≻ Z ≻ D, and the next n voters have preference order Z ≻ X ≻ D ≻ Y . Note that
the fixed-majority criterion requires that M be the unique winning committee.
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Committee M receives the total score of (n + 1)fm,k(Ik) + nfm,k(Jt), whereas committee N
receives the total score of (n+ 1)fm,k(It) + nfm,k(Ik). The difference between these values is:
(n+ 1)fm,k(Ik) + nfm,k(Jt)− (n+ 1)fm,k(It)− nfm,k(Ik) =
fm,k(Ik) + nfm,k(Jt)− (n+ 1)fm,k(It) =
fm,k(Ik)− fm,k(It) + n
(
fm,k(Jt)− fm,k(It)
)
,
which, for a large enough value of n, is negative (since, by assumption, we know that fm,k(Jt) <
fm,k(It) and so fm,k(Jt) − fm,k(It) is negative). That is, for large enough n, committee M does
not win the election and Rf fails the fixed-majority criterion.
So, if Rf satisfies the fixed-majority criterion, then for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k} we have that
fm,k(It) = fm,k(Jt). This, however, means that fm,k is a top-k-counting scoring function. To
see this, consider some sequence of positions L = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) ∈ [m]k where exactly the first
t entries are smaller than or equal to k. Clearly, we have that It  L  Jt and so fm,k(It) =
fm,k(L) = fm,k(Jt), which means that fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) depends only on the cardinality of the set
{t ∈ [k] : it ≤ k}. Since m and k where chosen arbitrarily (with 2k ≤ m), this completes the
proof.
Unfortunately, the converse of Theorem 4 does not hold: αk-CC, for example, is a top-k-
counting rule that fails the fixed-majority criterion.
Example 3. Consider an election E = (C, V ) with C = {a, b, c, d}, V = (v1, v2, v3), and k = 2.
Let the preference orders of the voters be:
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v2 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v3 : c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b.
The fixed-majority criterion requires {a, b} to be the only winning committee, while under αk-
CC, other committees, such as {a, c}, have strictly higher scores. (Incidentally, this example also
witnesses that SNTV fails the fixed-majority criterion; the fact is hardly surprising since SNTV is
not a top-k-counting rule.)
3.3 Criterion for Fixed-Majority Consistency
In this section, we provide a formal characterization of those top-k-counting rules that satisfy the
fixed-majority criterion. Together with Theorem 4, this gives a full characterization of committee
scoring rules with this property.
Theorem 5. Let f = (fm,k)2k≤m be a family of committee scoring functions with the corresponding
family (gm,k)2k≤m of counting functions. Then, Rf satisfies the fixed-majority criterion if and only
if for every k,m ∈ N, 2k ≤ m:
(i) gm,k is not constant, and
(ii) for each pair of nonnegative integers k1, k2 with k1 + k2 ≤ k, it holds that:
gm,k(k)− gm,k(k − k2) ≥ gm,k(k1 + k2)− gm,k(k1).
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kg(k)− g(k2)
g(k1 + k2)− g(k1)
k1 k1 + k2 k − k2
Figure 1: Illustration of the condition from Theorem 5.
Condition (ii) in Theorem 5 is a relaxation of the convexity property for function gm,k and is
illustrated in Figure 1. We discuss this in more detail after the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let fm,k be one of the committee scoring functions and gm,k be its corre-
sponding counting function. By Proposition 2, gm,k is nondecreasing so the fact that it is non-
constant is equivalent to gm,k(k) > gm,k(0). Moreover, we note that conditions (i) and (ii) imply
that for each k′ with 0 ≤ k′ ≤ k − 1, we have gm,k(k) > gm,k(k′). To see this we take k2 = 1
and note that for each k1 it holds that gm,k(k) − gm,k(k − 1) ≥ gm,k(k1 + 1) − gm,k(k1). As
gm,k(k) > gm,k(0), for some k1 we have that gm,k(k1 + 1) − gm,k(k1) > 0. Thus, we have that
gm,k(k)− gm,k(k− 1) ≥ gm,k(k1 +1)− gm,k(k1) > 0. Since gm,k is nondecreasing, it is also true
that gm,k(k) > gm,k(k′).
Let us now show that if for each m and k, gm,k satisfies (ii) then Rf has the fixed-majority
property. Let E = (C, V ) be an election with n voters and m candidates, for which there is a size-k
committee M such that a majority of the voters rank all members of M in the top k positions, but
M loses to some committee S 6= M (also of size k). That is, we have score(S) ≥ score(M). Let ξ
be a rational number, 12 < ξ ≤ 1, such that exactly ξn voters rank all the members of M in the top
k positions; we will refer to these voters as M -voters and to the others as non-M -voters.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the non-M -voters have identical preference
orders. Indeed, if it were the case that fm,k(posvi(S)) − fm,k(posvi(M)) > fm,k(posvj (S)) −
fm,k(posvj (M)) for some two non-M -voters vi and vj , then we could replace the preference order
of vj with that of vi and increase the advantage of S over M . If for all non-M -voters this difference
were the same, then we could simply pick the preference order of one of them and assign it to all
the other ones.
Let k1, k2, k3, and k4 be four numbers such that:
1. k1 is the number of candidates from S ∩M that the non-M -voters rank among their top k
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positions,
2. k2 is the number of candidates from S \M that the non-M -voters rank among their top k
positions, and
3. k3 is the number of candidates from C \ (S ∪M) that the non-M -voters rank among their
top k positions.
4. k4 is the number of candidates from M \ S that the non-M -voters rank among their top k
positions.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that k4 = 0 and that |S \M | = k2 (since m ≥ 2k, we
can replace all members of M \ S with candidates from C \M , and, similarly, we can ensure that
all members of S \ M are ranked among top k positions by non-M -voters; these changes never
decrease the score of S relative to that of M ). In effect, we have that k1 + k2 + k3 = k and, since
|S ∩M |+ |S \M | = k, we have that |S ∩M | = k − k2. We can assume that k2 > 0 as otherwise
we would have S = M . Given this notation, the difference between the scores of M and S is:
score(M)− score(S) =
ξn · gm,k(k) + (1− ξ)n · gm,k(k1)− ξn · gm,k(k − k2)− (1− ξ)n · gm,k(k1 + k2) =
ξn ·
(
gm,k(k)− gm,k(k − k2)
)
− (1− ξ)n ·
(
gm,k(k1 + k2)− gm,k(k1)
)
> 0,
where the second equality holds due to rearranging of terms, and the final inequality is an immediate
consequence of the assumptions regarding the value of ξ and the properties of gm,k (namely, that
gm,k(k) − gm,k(k − k2) ≥ gm,k(k1 + k2) − gm,k(k1) and that gm,k(k) − gm,k(k − k2) > 0).
This, however, contradicts the assumption that score(S) ≥ score(M) and, so, Rf satisfies the
fixed-majority criterion.
We now consider the other direction. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that Rf satis-
fies the fixed-majority criterion but that there existm and k such that either condition (i) or condition
(ii) is not satisfied. If gm,k is a constant function then Rf fails the fixed-majority criterion because
it always outputs all the subsets of size k, independently of voters’ preferences. Thus we assume
that gm,k is not constant. Suppose (ii) does not hold and there exist k1 and k2 with k1 + k2 ≤ k
such that gm,k(k)− gm,k(k− k2) < gm,k(k1 + k2)− gm,k(k1). We form an election with m candi-
dates, c1, . . . , cm, and 2n+ 1 voters (we describe the choice of n later). The first n+ 1 voters have
preference order:
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm,
and the remaining n voters have preference order:
c1 ≻ · · · ≻ ck1 ≻ cm ≻ cm−1 ≻ · · · ≻ ck1+1.
Since Rf satisfies the fixed-majority criterion, in this election it outputs the unique winning com-
mittee M = {c1, . . . , ck}. However, consider committee S:
S = {c1, . . . , ck1+k2 , cm, . . . , cm−(k−k1−k2)+1}.
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Since m ≥ 2k, the difference between the scores of M and S is:
score(M)− score(S) =
(n+ 1)gm,k(k) + ngm,k(k1)− (n+ 1)gm,k(k1 + k2)− ngm,k(k − k2) =
n
(
gm,k(k) − gm,k(k − k2)
)
+ gm,k(k)− n
(
gm,k(k1 + k2)− gm,k(k1)
)
− gm,k(k1 + k2).
Since gm,k(k) − gm,k(k − k2) < gm,k(k1 + k2) − gm,k(k1), we observe that for large enough
n the difference score(M) − score(S) becomes negative. This is a contradiction showing that (ii)
holds.
Let us take a step back and consider what condition (ii) from Theorem 5 means (recall Figure 1).
Intuitively, it resembles the convexity condition, but ‘focused’ on gm,k(k).
Definition 7. Let gm,k be a counting function for some top-k-counting function fm,k : [m]k → N.
We say that gm,k is convex if for each k′ such that 2 ≤ k′ ≤ k, it holds that:
gm,k(k
′)− gm,k(k
′ − 1) ≥ gm,k(k
′ − 1)− gm,k(k
′ − 2).
On the other hand, we say that g is concave if for each k′ with 2 ≤ k′ ≤ k it holds that:
gm,k(k
′)− gm,k(k
′ − 1) ≤ gm,k(k
′ − 1)− gm,k(k
′ − 2).
The notions of convexity and concavity are standard, but allow us to express many features of
top-k-counting rules in a very intuitive way. For example, the following corollary is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 5.
Corollary 6. Let f = (fm,k)2k≤m be a family of top-k-counting committee scoring functions with
the corresponding family (gm,k)2k≤m. of counting functions. The following hold:
(1) if gm,k are convex, then Rf satisfies the fixed-majority criterion, and
(2) if gm,k are concave but not linear (that is, Rf is not Bloc) then Rf fails the fixed-majority
criterion.
The counting function for the Bloc rule is linear (and, thus, both convex and concave), and the
counting function for the Perfectionist rule is convex, so these two rules satisfy the fixed-majority
criterion. On the other hand, the counting function for αk-CC is concave and, so, this rule fails the
criterion (as we observed in Example 3).
By Proposition 3, a family of concave counting functions gm,k corresponds to a nonincreasing
OWA operator, and a family of convex counting functions corresponds to a nondecreasing one.
Skowron et al. [SFL15] provided evidence that rules based on nonincreasing OWA operators are
computationally easier than those based on general OWA operators (though, still their winners tend
to be NP-hard to compute). In the next section we show that this seems to be the case for top-k-
counting rules as well, but we also provide a striking example highlighting certain dissimilarity.
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4 Complexity of Top-k-Counting Rules
In this section, we consider the computational complexity of winner determination for top-k-
counting rules which are based on either convex or concave counting functions. We start by consid-
ering several examples.
It is well-known that Bloc winners can be computed in polynomial time. The same holds for the
Perfectionist rule.
Proposition 7. Both the Bloc and Perfectionist winners are computable in polynomial time.
Proof. The case of Bloc is well-known (as we mentioned, the Bloc rule is weakly separable and
to form a winning committee of size k it suffices to pick k candidates with the highest k-Approval
scores). To find a size-k winning committee under the Perfectionist rule, for each voter v we consider
the set of her top-k candidates as a committee, and compute the score of that committee in the
election. We output those committees—among the considered ones—that have the highest score.
Correctness follows by noting that the committees that the algorithm considers are the only ones
with nonzero scores.
While the result for the Perfectionist rule is very simple, it stands in sharp contrast to the results
of Skowron, Faliszewski and Lang [SFL15]. By Proposition 3, Perfectionist is defined through the
OWA operator (0, . . . , 0, 1), and Skowron et al. have shown that, in general, rules defined through
this operator are NP-hard to compute and very difficult to approximate. However, their result relies
on the fact that voters can approve any number of candidates, while in our case they have to approve
exactly k of them. This shows very clearly that even though top-k-counting rules are OWA-based,
we cannot simply carry over the hardness results of Skowron et al. [SFL15] or Aziz et al. [AGG+15]
to our framework.
We can generalize Proposition 7 to rules that are, in some sense, similar to Perfectionist. To
this end, and to facilitate our later discussion regarding the complexity of top-k-counting rules, we
define the following property of counting functions.
Definition 8. Let gm,k be a counting function for a top-k-counting function fm,k : [m]k → N. We
define the singularity of gm,k, denoted sing(gm,k), to be
sing(gm,k) = argmin
2≤i≤k
(
gm,k(i)− gm,k(i− 1) 6= gm,k(i− 1)− gm,k(i− 2)
)
.
Loosely speaking, sing(gm,k) is the smallest integer in {2, . . . , k} for which the differential of
gm,k changes. For Bloc (which is an exception) we define sing(gm,k) to be ∞, since the differen-
tial is a constant function. Naturally, for all other non-constant rules, the singularity is finite. For
example, for Perfectionist we have sing(gm,k) = k.
We generalize the polynomial-time algorithm for Perfectionist to similar rules, for which the
value sing(gm,k) is close to k.
Proposition 8. Let f = (fm,k)2k≤m be a top-k-counting family of (polynomial-time computable)
committee scoring functions with the corresponding family of counting functions (gm,k)2k≤m, and
17
Rf be the corresponding top-k-counting rule. Let q be a constant, positive integer such that
k − sing(gm,k) ≤ q holds for all m and k. Then Rf has a polynomial-time computable winner
determination problem.
Proof. Let the input consist of election E = (C, V ) and positive integer k, and let W be a winning
committee in R(E, k). We assume that q < k2 (if it were not the case, then k ≤ 2q would be small
and we could solve the problem using brute-force). We consider two cases: (1) there is at least one
voter that has at least sing(gm,k) of his or her top k candidates in W ; (2) every voter has less than
sing(gm,k) of his or her top k candidates in W .
If case (1) holds, then we can compute W (or some other winning committee) by checking, for
each voter v, all the committees that consist of at least sing(gm,k) candidates that v ranks among his
or her top k positions. Since k − sing(gm,k) ≤ q, the number of committees that we have to check
for each voter is:
k∑
t=sing(gm,k)
(
k
t
)(
m
k − t
)
≤ (q + 1) ·
(
k
k − sing(gm,k)
)(
m
k − sing(gm,k)
)
,
which is a polynomial in k and m. The above inequality requires some care: We have that
sing(gm,k) >
k
2 (because k − sing(gm,k) ≤ q < k2 ) and, in effect, we have that for each
t ∈ {sing(gm,k), . . . , k} it holds that
(
k
t
)
=
(
k
k−t
)
≤
(
k
k−sing(gm,k)
)
and
(
m
k−t
)
≤
(
m
k−sing(gm,k)
)
.
If case (2) holds, then from the fact that gm,k(x)−gm,k(x−1) is a constant for x ≤ sing(gm,k),
we infer that gm,k(x) is effectively linear. Then, it suffices to compute the winning committee using
the Bloc rule. While we do not know which of the two cases holds, we can compute the two com-
mittees, one as in case (1) and one as in case (2), and output the one with the higher score (or either
of them, in case of a tie).
Example 4. Consider the following committee scoring function:
f ′m,k(i1, . . . , ik) = fBloc(i1, . . . , ik) + fPerf(i1, . . . , ik) = αk(i1) + · · ·+ αk(ik−1) + 2αk(ik).
As a simple application of Proposition 8, we get that the committee scoring ruleRf ′ defined through
f ′ is polynomial-time computable. This rule can be seen as a variant of Bloc, where a voter gives
additional one bonus point to a committee if he or she approves of all its members. By Corollary 6,
this rule is fixed-majority consistent.
It is also interesting to consider the rule which is defined through the following committee scor-
ing function:
f ′′m,k(i1, . . . , ik) = fSNTV(i1, . . . , ik) + fPerf(i1, . . . , ik) = α1(i1) + αk(ik).
The corresponding rule is also polynomial-time computable (it suffices to compute an SNTV winning
committee, and compare it with such committees whose all members stand on first k positions in
some voter’s preference ranking), but it is not a top-k-counting rule and, so, it fails the fixed-majority
criterion.
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Yet, as one might expect, not all top-k-counting rules are polynomial-time solvable and, indeed,
most of them are not (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions). For example, αk-CC is
NP-hard (this follows quite easily from Theorem 1 of Procaccia et al. [PRZ08]; we include a brief
proof to substantiate the discussion and give the reader some intuition).
Proposition 9. For αk-CC it is NP-hard to decide whether or not there exists a committee with at
least a given score (recall that k in αk-CC is the committee size and, thus, is part of the input).
Proof. The NP-hardness follows easily from a standard reduction from the EXACT COVER BY 3-
SETS problem, abbreviated as X3C. In an instance of X3C we are given a family of m subsets,
S1, . . . , Sm, each of cardinality 3, chosen from a given universal set U = {x1, . . . , x3n}; we ask
if there are n subsets from the family whose union is U . Additionally, we may assume that each
element of U belongs to at most three subsets since it is well-known that this variant of X3C
remains NP-complete.
Given an instance of X3C, we create a candidate for each subset, and a voter for each element of
U . Voters rank the elements of the subsets to which they belong in their top positions, then they rank
some n dummy candidates (different ones for each voter), and then all the remaining candidates (in
some arbitrary, easy to compute, order). We ask for a committee of size k = n. There is a winning
committee with score 3n if and only if the answer for the input instance is “yes.”
We generalize the above NP-hardness result to the case of convex top-k-counting rules Rf for
which there is some constant c such that for each k and m it holds that k − sing(gm,k) ≥ k/c
(that is, to the case of convex counting functions for which the differential changes ‘early’). An
analogous result for concave counting functions follows from the works of Skowron, Faliszewski,
and Lang [SFL15] and Aziz et al. [AGG+15].
Theorem 10. Let Rf be a top-k-counting rule defined through a family f of top-k-counting func-
tions fm,k : [m]k → N with the corresponding family of counting functions (gm,k)k≤m that do not
depend on m, gm,k = gk, and such that:
1. For each x, 0 ≤ x ≤ k, gk(x) is computable in polynomial time with respect to k (that is,
there is a polynomial time algorithm that given x and k outputs gk(x)). Moreover, for each k,
gk(k) is polynomially bounded in k.
2. There is a constant c such that, for each size of committee k greater than some fixed constant
k0, gk is convex and k − sing(gk) ≥ k/c.
Then, deciding if there is a committee with at least a given score is NP-hard for Rf .
Proof. We prove NP-hardness of the problem by giving a reduction from the CLIQUE problem on
regular graphs. A graph is regular if all its vertices have the same degree. In the CLIQUE problem we
are given a graph G and an integer h, and we ask if there exists a set of h pairwise adjacent vertices
in G (such a set of vertices is referred to as a size-h clique). The problem remains NP-complete
when restricted to regular graphs [GJ79].
19
Let G be the input regular graph, let h be the size of the clique sought for, and let δ be the
common degree of G’s vertices. If h > δ + 1, then, of course, the graph does not contain a size-
h clique and we output a fixed “no”-instance of our problem. Otherwise, we output an instance
according to the following construction (intuitively, since each gk is convex, the rule promotes
situations where voters rank many members of the committee among their top k candidates; we
exploit this fact).
We set the committee size k to be (c+2)h. Since gk does not depend on the number of candidates
in the election, this fixes the counting function that we work with and we will denote it g. If k ≤ k0
(recall that k0 is defined in the statement of the theorem), then we solve the input instance using
brute force in polynomial time and output either a fixed “yes”-instance or a fixed “no”-instance,
depending on the result. We note that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ sing(g), all the values g(i) − g(i − 1)
are equal and, without loss of generality, we can assume them to either all be 0s or all be 1s (if this
were not the case, we could scale g appropriately). Similarly, since g is convex, we can assume that
g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 1) > 1. We note that k − sing(g) ≥ k/c = (c + 2)h/c > h and, so,
sing(g) < k − h.
We form an election with the following candidates:
1. For each vertex v from the graph G, we create a candidate v.
2. We create a set {c1, . . . , csing(g)−2} of candidates, called the edge-filler candidates. These
candidates will be in the top-k positions of all the voters, and hence will be chosen to every
winning committee.
3. We create a set {b1, . . . , bk−h−(sing(g)−2)} of candidates, called general-filler candidates.
There will be sufficiently many voters who rank them in their top-k positions so that they
will also be in every winning committee.
4. We also create a set of dummy candidates, such that each dummy candidate is ranked among
the top-k positions of exactly one voter.
Let m be the total number of edges in G. For each edge e, we create a set of 2g(k) voters corre-
sponding to this edge; each voter in this set has the following candidates in the top k positions of
his or her preference order:
1. The two candidates corresponding to the endpoints of e.
2. All the edge-filler candidates.
3. Sufficiently many dummy candidates (such that they are ranked among top k positions only
by this voter).
Further, we create 2g(k) · (m+ h) · g(k) filler voters, who rank the following candidates in the top
k positions:
1. All the edge-filler candidates.
2. All the general-filler candidates.
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3. Sufficiently many dummy candidates (different dummy candidates for each filler voter).
(The role of the 2g(k) multiplicity factor regarding both the edge voters and the filler voters it to
ensure that the best committee does not contain any of the dummy candidates; this will become
clear later in the proof.)
We ask whether there is a committee W whose score is at least T = T1 + T2 + T3 + T4, where:
T1 = 2g(k) · (m+ h) · g(k) · g(k − h),
T2 = 2g(k) ·m · g(sing(g) − 2),
T3 = 2g(k) · δh ·
(
g(sing(g) − 1)− g(sing(g)− 2)
)
,
T4 = 2g(k) ·
(
h
2
)(
g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 2)− 2(g(sing(g)− 1)− g(sing(g)− 2))
)
.
Note that each Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, is nonnegative (for T4 this is due to convexity of g). The meaning
of these values will become clear throughout the proof. This finishes the construction. Due to the
assumptions regarding the counting function, the reduction is polynomial-time computable.
Let us now argue that the reduction is correct. First, we claim that if a committee W has a score
of at least T , then it must contain all the edge-filler candidates and all the general-filler candidates.
We note that altogether we have k − h edge-filler and general-filler candidates. Consider some
committee W ′ that contains k− h− x candidates of these two types, where x ≥ 1. This means that
W ′ contains at most h+ x dummy candidates.
Let y be the number of filler voters that rank at least k − h members of W ′ among their top
k positions. Let us call these filler voters well-satisfied. For each of the well-satisfied filler voters,
the members of W ′ ranked on top k positions are (a) the k − h − x edge-filler and general-filler
candidates from W ′, and (b) at least x unique dummy candidates. Thus it must hold that xy ≤ h+x
and, so, y ≤ h
x
+ 1. If x ≥ 2, then it must be that y ≤ h. If x = 1, then this inequality gives us
that y ≤ h+ 1. However, for y to be h + 1, W ′ would have to consist of k − h− 1 edge-filler and
general-filler candidates and h+1 dummy candidates. Each of these dummy candidates would have
to be ranked among top k positions by exactly one of the y well-satisfied filler voters. This would
mean that for each edge voter, the only members of W ′ ranked by this voter among top k positions
would be (some of) the edge-filler candidates. Consequently, all the edge voters would rank at
most k − h − 1 members of W ′ among their top k positions. In either case (that is, irrespective
if x = 1 or x ≥ 2), we can upper-bound the score of committee W ′ by assuming that there are
2g(k) · (m + h) · g(k) − h voters that assign score g(k − h − 1) to W ′ and 2g(k) ·m + h voters
that assign score g(k) to it. In effect, we have the following inequalities (also see the explanations
below):
score(W ′) ≤
(
2g(k) · (m+ h) · g(k) − h)
)
· g(k − h− 1) + (2g(k) ·m+ h) · g(k)
= 2g(k) · (m+ h) · g(k) · g(k − h− 1)− h · g(k − h− 1) + (2g(k) ·m+ h) · g(k)
< 2g(k) · (m+ h) · g(k) ·
(
g(k − h)− 1
)
− h · g(k − h− 1) + (2g(k) ·m+ h) · g(k)
= T1 − 2g(k) · (m+ h) · g(k) − h · g(k − h− 1) + (2g(k) ·m+ h) · g(k)
= T1 − 2g(k) · (m+ h) · g(k) − h · g(k − h− 1) + 2g(k) ·m · g(k) + h · g(k)
= T1 − 2g(k) · h · g(k)− h · g(k − h− 1) + h · g(k) ≤ T1 < T.
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The second inequality holds because g(k− h) > g(k− h− 1) + 1 (which holds due to the fact that
g is convex, g(sing(g))− g(sing(g)− 1) > 1, and sing(g) < k − h). Further inequalities hold due
to simple calculations. Due to the above reasoning, we can assume that every committee with score
at least T contains all the k − h filler candidates.
Consider some committee that contains all the k − h filler candidates. We claim that if this
committee contains some dummy candidates then there is another committee with a higher score.
Why is this so? Assume that the committee contains some z dummy candidates (z ≤ h). If we
simply removed these dummy candidates (obtaining a smaller committee) then we would lose at
most z · g(k) points. Then, we could bring the committee back to its intended side by performing
the following operations sufficiently many times: Either adding to the committee a single vertex
candidate (already connected by an edge to one from the committee) or adding to the committee two
vertex candidates connected by an edge. Each of these actions increases the score of the committee
by at least 2g(k)
(
g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 1)
)
> 2g(k) (because for each edge there are 2g(k)
corresponding edge voters). Thus, would obtain a committee with a score higher than the one we
have started with. (Note that, technically, there might be no sequence of operations that brings our
committee back to size k, but this would only happen if the graph had too few edges to contain a
clique of size h and we could recognize that this is the case in polynomial time.)
Let W be some winning committee that contains all the k − h filler candidates, and some h
vertex candidates (by the above paragraph, this committee cannot contain any dummy candidates),
and let r be the number of edges that connect the vertices corresponding to the vertex candidates
from W . Let us now calculate the score of W . The filler candidates provide score T1. The situation
regarding the edge voters requires more care.
Each edge voter gets score at least g(sing(g)−2) due to the edge-filler candidates. For each edge
for which at least one endpoint is in W , we get additional g(sing(g) − 1) − g(sing(g) − 2) points,
and for each edge whose both endpoints are in W , we get yet additional g(sing(g))−g(sing(g)−1)
points. Thus, the edge voters give W the following score (see detailed explanations below):
(
2g(k) ·m · g(sing(g) − 2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=T2
+
(
2g(k) · δh ·
(
g(sing(g)− 1)− g(sing(g) − 2)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=T3
+
(
2g(k) · r ·
(
g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 2)− 2(g(sing(g)− 1)− g(sing(g)− 2))
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤T4
.
The first main term corresponds to the points all the edge voters receive, the second is the correction
for edge voters that correspond to edges that have at least one endpoint in W (note that if for some
edge both its endpoints belong to W , then we add g(sing(g)− 1)− g(sing(g)− 2) twice, once for
each endpoint), and the final term corresponds to the correction for edges that have two endpoints
in W . Let us now explain why this final correction is appropriate. Consider some edge voter for an
edge whose both endpoints are in W . For this voter, we account g(sing(g) − 2) points that each
edge voter gets, we account g(sing(g) − 1) − g(sing(g) − 2) points for each of the endpoints, and
g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 1) − 2(g(sing(g) − 1) − g(sing(g) − 2)) points of the final correction.
22
Altogether, this sums up to:
g(sing(g) − 2) + 2(g(sing(g)− 1)− g(sing(g)− 2)) + g(sing(g))− g(sing(g)− 1)
− 2(g(sing(g)− 1)− g(sing(g)− 2)) = g(sing(g)).
This means that, indeed, we compute the score of edge voters for edges whose both endpoints are
in W correctly. The same holds for all the other edge voters (and follows directly from the above
analysis).
Finally, we note that the score W that we obtain from the edge voters is maximized when
r is maximized. The maximum value that r may have is
(
h
2
)
, which happens if and only if the
vertex candidates in W correspond to a clique. Then the score that the edge voters provide equals
T2 + T3 + T4 and the total score of the committee is T .
We conclude, that there exists a committee with score at least T if and only if the input graph
contains a size-h clique.
Let us now discuss the assumptions of the theorem, where they come from and why we believe
they are natural (or necessary).
First, the assumption that the counting functions are computable in polynomial time is standard
and clear. Indeed, it would not be particularly interesting to seek hardness results if already the
counting functions were hard to compute.
Second, we believe that the assumption that the counting functions gm,k do not depend on m is
reasonable. For example, it is quite intuitive that adding some candidates that all the voters rank last
should not have any effect on the committee selected by a top-k-counting rule. (The assumption is
also very helpful on the technical level. Our construction uses a number of dummy candidates that
depends on the values of the counting function. If the values of the counting function depended on
the number of candidates, we might end up with a very problematic, circular dependence.)
Third, the assumption that there is a constant c such that for each large enough committee size
k we have k− sing(gk) ≥ k/c says that the function “shows its convex behavior” early enough. As
shown in Proposition 8, some assumption of this form is necessary (though there is still a gap, since
the bounds from the theorem and from Proposition 8 do not match perfectly), and it is the core of
the theorem.
Finally, perhaps the least intuitive assumption in this theorem is the requirement that for a given
committee size k, the highest value of the counting function is polynomially bounded in k. The
reason for having it is that if the highest value were extremely large (say, exponentially large with
respect to k) then, for sufficiently few voters (for example, polynomially many), the rule might
degenerate to a polynomial-time computable rule (for example, it might resemble the Perfectionist
rule for this case). Exactly to avoid such problems, in our proof we use a number of voters that
depends on gk(k). Our reduction would not run in polynomial time if gk(k) were superpolynomial.
A result similar to Theorem 10, but for concave rules, is possible as well (and, in essence, follows
from the proofs of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15] and Aziz et al. [AGG+15]). Thus, in
general, top-k-counting functions tend to be NP-hard to compute. What can we do if we need to
use them anyway? There are several possibilities. We consider approximability and fixed-parameter
tractability as possible approaches.
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4.1 Approximability
First, for concave top-k-counting rules we can obtain a constant-factor approximation algorithm (we
deduce it from the result of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15], which—in essence—boils
down to optimizing a submodular function using the seminal results of Nemhauser et al. [NWF78]).
Theorem 11. Let Rf be a top-k-counting rule defined through a family f of (polynomial-time com-
putable) top-k-counting functions fm,k : [m]k → N with corresponding counting functions gm,k
that are concave. Then there is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given an election E and a com-
mittee size k, computes a committee W of size k, whose score, under Rf , is at least a (1 − 1e )
fraction of the score of the winning committee(s) from Rf (E, k)
Proof. This follows from the fact that concave top-k-counting rules correspond to OWA-based rules
that use nonincreasing OWA operators. For such rules, there is a (1 − 1
e
)-approximation algo-
rithm for computing the score of the winning committees and for computing a committee with
such score [SFL15, Theorem 4].
Such a general result for convex counting functions seems impossible. Let us consider a convex
counting function gm,k(x) = max(x − 1, 0) that is nearly identical to the linear counting func-
tion used by Bloc. Let us refer to the top-k-counting rule defined by (gm,k)k≤m as NearlyBloc.
If we had a polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm for NearlyBloc, we would
have a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the DENSEST AT MOST K SUBGRAPH problem
(abbreviated as DAMKS; see below). Taking into account the results of Khuller and Saha [KS09],
Raghavendra and Steurer [RS10], and Alon et al. [AAM+11], this seems very unlikely.
Before we define the DAMKS problem, we need to provide some notation. In this paper we
reserved the symbols E and V to denote elections and voter collections, respectively. These symbols
are also commonly used to denote the sets of edges and vertices of graphs. To avoid confusion, given
a graph G, we refer to its sets of vertices and edges as V (G) and E(G), respectively. The density of
a graph G is defined as δ = |E(G)||V (G)| .
Definition 9. In the DENSEST AT MOST K SUBGRAPH problem, DAMKS, we are given a graph G
and we ask for a subgraph of G of the highest possible density with at most K vertices.
Theorem 12. There is no polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm for the problem
of computing the score of a winning committee under NearlyBloc, unless such an algorithm exists
for the DAMKS problem.
Proof. Let θ be a positive real, 0 < θ < 1. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is
a polynomial-time algorithm A that, given an election E and committee size k, outputs a committee
W such that, under NearlyBloc the score of W is at least an θ fraction of the score of the winning
committee. Using A, we will derive an θ2 -approximation algorithm for the DAMKS problem.
Let I be an instance of the DAMKS problem with a graph G and an integer K . Our algorithm
proceeds as follows. For each B, 1 ≤ B ≤ K , we form an election EB = (CB , VB) where:
1. The set of candidates is CB = V (G) ∪
⋃
e∈E(G)De, where for each e ∈ E(G), De =
{de,1, . . . de,B−2} is the set of dummy candidates needed for our construction.
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2. The collection VB of voters is such that for each edge e = {u1, u2} ∈ E(G) we have exactly
one voter with preference order of the form {u1, u2} ≻ De ≻ · · · .
For each election EB , we run algorithm A to find a committee WB of size B. Each such committee
WB generates an induced graph GB with the vertex set V (G) ∩ WB . We let G0 be the trivial
subgraph ofG consisting of two vertices and their connecting edge (ifG had no edges, then we could
output a trivial optimal solution at this point). We output the densest graph among G0, G1, . . . , GK .
Let us now argue that the above algorithm is an θ2 -approximation algorithm for the DAMKS
problem. Let OPT be an optimal solution for I , with the densest subgraph G′ consisting of B
vertices and X edges. By definition, G′ has density δ = X
B
. For each B let us consider two cases:
Case 1: X ≤ B
θ
. In this case, the density of the optimal graph is at most equal to 1
θ
. However, a
trivial solution with two vertices connected with an edge has density equal to 12 . Thus, in this
case this trivial solution is θ2 -approximate.
Case 2: X > B
θ
. In this case we know that there exists a size-B committee for election EB with
score at least X. Indeed, the committee that consists of the vertices from G′ obtains one point
for each edge from G′ and has score X. Thus A for EB and committee size B outputs a
committee W ′ with score at least θX. Let U ′ = W ′ ∩ V (G) (that is, let U ′ be the part of this
committee that consists of the vertex candidates) and let D′ = W ′ − U ′ (that is, let D′ be
the set of dummy candidates from W ′). We observe that the graph induced by U ′ has at least
θX − |D′| edges. To see this, note that since each dummy candidate is ranked among top B
positions by exactly one voter, removing a dummy candidate from the committee—in effect
decreasing the committee size—decreases the total score by at most one. Thus the committee
consisting only of candidates from U ′ has score at least θX − |D′| and each of the points
obtained by this committee comes from an edge between some members of U ′.
The graph induced by U ′ has density δ′ such that:
δ′ =
θX − |D′|
B − |D′|
=
θX
B
·
B(θX − |D′|)
θX · (B − |D′|)
= θδ ·
B(θX − |D′|)
θX · (B − |D′|)
≥ θδ,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that B < θx. Indeed, note that:
B(θX − |D′|) = θXB −B|D′| ≥ θXB − θX|D′| = θX · (B − |D′|).
By our assumptions, one of these conditions must hold. This means that the graph induced by
U ′ is an θ-approximate solution for I .
Since in both cases we obtain at least θ2 -approximate solutions, our algorithm is
θ
2 -approximate.
Since it is clear that it runs in polynomial time, the proof is complete.
Nonetheless, for top-k-counting rules that are not too far from αk-CC, we have a polynomial-
time approximation scheme (PTAS), that is, an algorithm that can achieve any desired approxima-
tion ratio, as long as the number of candidates is not too large relative to the committee size. This
result holds even for rules that are not concave (provided they satisfy the conditions of the theorem);
the result follows by noting that our voters have non-finicky utilities [SFL15].
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Theorem 13. LetRf be a top-k-counting committee scoring rule, where the family f = (fm,k)k≤m
is defined through a family of counting functions (gm,k)k≤m that are: (a) polynomial-time com-
putable and (b) constant for arguments greater than some given value ℓ. If m = o(k2), there is a
PTAS for computing the score of a winning committee under Rf .
Proof. We use the concept of non-finicky utilities provided by Skowron et al. [SFL15]. Adapting
their terminology, we say that a single-winner scoring function γm : [m] → N (for elections with
m candidates) is (ξ, δ)-non-finicky for ξ, δ ∈ [0, 1], if each of the highest ⌈δm⌉ numbers in the
sequence γm(1), . . . , γm(m) is greater or equal to ξγm(1). It is easy to see that αk is (1, km )-non-
finicky.
Consider an input election E = (C, V ) with m candidates, and committee size k, such that
m = o(k2). By Proposition 3, we know that fm,k is OWA-based, that it uses some OWA operator
Λm,k that has nonzero entries on the top ℓ positions only, and that it uses scoring function αk
(which is a (1, k
m
)-non-finicky). Thus, due to Skowron et al. [SFL15], there is a polynomial-time(
1− ℓ exp
(
− k
2
mℓ2
))
-approximation algorithm for computing the score of a winning committee
under f .7 Using the assumption that m = o(k2), the approximation ratio of the algorithm is:
α = 1− ℓ exp
(
−
k2
mℓ2
)
= 1− ℓ exp
(
−
k2
o(k2)ℓ2
)
= 1− ℓ exp
(
−
1
o(1)
)
= 1− o(1).
This completes the proof.
Theorem 13 is quite remarkable even for the case of αk-CC (let alone that it applies to a some-
what more general set of rules). Indeed, generally, variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule that use
some sort of approval scoring function are hard to compute [PRZ08, BSU13] and the best possible
approximation ratio for a polynomial-time algorithm, in the general case, is 1 − 1
e
(this result was
observed by Skowron and Faliszewski [SF15] and follows from results for the MaxCover prob-
lem [Fei98]). However, this upper bound relies on the fact that there is no connection between the
size of the input election, the committee size, and the number of candidates that each voter ap-
proves. We obtain a PTAS because we assume that for the committee size k each voter approves of
k candidates, and that the number m of candidates is such that m = o(k2).
One may ask how likely it is that this last assumption holds. As a piece of anecdotal evidence,
we mention that in the 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland, there were k = 460 seats in the par-
liament and m ≈ 8000 candidates. In this case, m/k2 ≈ 0.0378, which suggests that our algorithm
could be effective (provided that the voters could say which k candidates they approve of; likely,
this would require some sort of simplified ballots, for example, allowing one to approve blocks of
candidates).
4.2 Fixed-Parameter Tractability
If one were not interested in approximation algorithms but still wanted to use top-k-counting rules,
then one might seek fixed-parameter tractable algorithms. In parameterized complexity we concen-
7Strictly speaking, the exact formulation of the result that we invoke here appears only in the full version of their
work [SFL16, Theorem 29], and not in the conference extended abstract.
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trate on some distinguished parameter in the problem instances, such as the number of candidates
or the number of voters. We say that a parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable (is in
FPT) if there is an algorithm that, given an instance of this problem of size n with parameter t,
computes an answer for the problem in time f(t)nO(1), where f is some computable function (such
an algorithm is also said to run in FPT-time with respect to parameter t). For a detailed description
of parameterized complexity, we point the readers to the books of Downey and Fellows [DF99],
Niedermeier [Nie06], and Cygan et al. [CFK+15].
We start with a very simple observation, namely that a winning committee can be computed for
every top-k-counting rule in FPT time for the parameterization by the number of candidates.
Proposition 14. Let Rf be a top-k-counting committee scoring rule, where the family f =
(fm,k)k≤m is defined through a family of counting functions (gm,k)k≤m (that are computable in
FPT time with respect to m). There is an algorithm that, given a committee size k and an election
E, computes a winning committee from Rf (E, k) in FPT-time with respect to the number m of
candidates.
Proof. The algorithm simply computes the score of every possible committee and outputs the one
with the highest score. With m candidates and committee size k, the algorithm has to check
(
m
k
)
=
O(mm) committees, and checking each committee requires FPT time only.
For rules based on concave counting functions we can also provide a far less trivial FPT algo-
rithm for the parameterization by the number of voters.
Theorem 15. LetRf be a top-k-counting committee scoring rule, where the family f = (fm,k)k≤m
is defined through a family of concave counting functions (gm,k)k≤m. There is an algorithm that,
given a committee size k and an election E, computes a winning committee from Rf (E, k) in FPT-
time with respect to the number n of voters.
Proof. Our algorithm is based on solving a mixed integer linear program (MILP) in FPT-time with
respect to the number of integral variables. The key trick is to use non-integral variables in such a
way that in every optimal solution they have to take integral values (this technique was first used by
Bredereck et al. [BFN+15]).
Let k be the input committee size and E = (C, V ) be the input election, where C =
{c1, . . . , cm} is the set of candidates, V = (v1, . . . , vn) is the collection of voters.
We enumerate all the nonempty subsets of V as S1, . . . , S2n−1. For each i ∈ [2n − 1], let
T (Si) denote the largest set of candidates that satisfies the following condition: Every voter in Si
ranks each candidate from T (Si) among the top k positions and no other voter ranks either of the
candidates from T (Si) among top k positions. Note that T (S1), . . . ,T (S2n) is a partition of C . We
illustrate this partition in the following example.
Example 5. Consider an election E = (C, V ) with C = {a, b, c, d, e, f} and V = (v1, . . . , v6),
where the voters have the following preference orders (we set the committee size k = 3 and, thus,
we list only top k positions for each vote):
v1 : c ≻ d ≻ f ≻ · · · , v2 : c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ · · · , v3 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ · · · ,
v4 : c ≻ e ≻ f ≻ · · · , v5 : d ≻ e ≻ f ≻ · · · , v6 : a ≻ b ≻ e ≻ · · · .
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maximize
∑n
i=1
∑k
j=1 xi,j · (gm,k(j) − gm,k(j − 1))
subject to:
(a)
2n−1∑
i=1
zi = k,
(b) xi =
∑
j : i∈Sj
zj , i ∈ [n]
(c)
k∑
j=1
xi,j = xi, i ∈ [n]
(d) 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1, i ∈ [n]; j ∈ [k]
(e) 0 ≤ zi ≤ |T (Si)|, i ∈ [2n − 1]
Figure 2: The Mixed Integer Linear Program used in the proof of Theorem 15.
We have the following sets: T ({v3, v6}) = {a, b} since only voters v3 and v6 rank a and b on top
three positions (and there are no other candidates they both rank among their top three positions).
Then, we have: T ({v1, v2, v3, v4}) = {c}, T ({v1, v2, v5}) = {d}, T ({v2, v4, v5, v6}) = {e}, and
T ({v1, v4, v5}) = {f}. For every other subset Si of voters, we have T (Si) = ∅. For example,
T {v4, v5} = ∅ for the following reasons: The candidates that both v4 and v5 rank on top three
positions are e and f . However, each of these candidates is ranked among top three positions also
by some other voter(s).
Our algorithm forms a mixed integer linear program with the following variables. We have 2n−1
integer variables, z1, . . . z2n−1, where, intuitively, each zi describes how many candidates from the
set T (Si) we take into the winning committee. For each i ∈ [n] we also have an integer variable
xi, which describes how many candidates from the top k positions of the preference order of voter
vi belongs to the winning committee. Finally, for each variable xi, we have rational variables xi,j ,
0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1, such that (intuitively) each xi,j is 1 if xi is at least j. We present our mixed integer
linear program in Figure 2. To solve this program, we invoke Lenstra’s famous result in its variant
for mixed integer programming [Len83, Section 5].
Now it remains to argue that it indeed outputs a correct solution, that is, that the variables
z1, . . . , z2n−1 describe a winning committee. If all the variables have the intended, intuitive values
(as described in the preceding paragraph), then—with our maximization goal in mind—one can
verify that variables z1, . . . , z2n−1 describe a winning committee. Thus we show that, indeed, all
the variables have their intended values.
28
Due to constraints (a) and (e), variables z1, . . . , z2n−1 certainly describe a possible committee
of size k (from each set T (Si) we take zi arbitrary candidates). Constraints (b) ensure the correct
values of variables x1, . . . , xn. Finally, the maximization goal and constraints (c) ensure that each
variable xi,j is 1 exactly if xi ≥ j and is 0 otherwise. This is so, because gm,k is concave. Thus,
if for some values j and j′ with j < j′ it was the case that xi,j < 1 and xi,j′ > 0 then increasing
xi,j and decreasing xi,j′ by the same amount (without breaking constraint (d)) would yield a higher
value of the function to be maximized.
To summarize, it appears that most (but certainly not all) top-k-counting rules are NP-hard to
compute. For top-k-counting rules based on concave counting functions, there are good polynomial-
time approximation algorithms and some exact FPT algorithms. On the other hand, for rules based
on convex functions the situation is much more difficult. Aside from several algorithms that do
not depend on concavity or convexity of the counting problem (for instance the algorithms from
Theorem 13 and Proposition 14), so far we only have evidence for hardness of approximation.
5 Conclusions and Further Research
Aiming at finding a multiwinner analogue of the single-winner Plurality rule, we have shown that
the answer is quite involved. While intuitively SNTV is a natural analogue of Plurality, it fails the
fixed-majority criterion (which Plurality satisfies in the single-winner setting). We have found that,
among all committee scoring rules, only the top-k-counting rules—a class of rules we have defined
in this paper—have a chance of satisfying our criterion, and we have characterized exactly when
this happens. Specifically, we have shown that the committee scoring rules which satisfy the fixed-
majority criterion are exactly those top-k-counting rules whose counting functions satisfy a relaxed
variant of convexity.
For example, the Bloc and Perfectionist rules both satisfy the fixed-majority criterion and, so,
in some sense, they are among the multiwinner analogues of Plurality (for the Perfectionist rule this
goes quite deep). On the other hand, a variant of the Chamberlin–Courant rule based on k-Approval
scoring function is top-k-counting, but fails the fixed-majority criterion.
We believe that it is most interesting to focus on top-k-counting rules based either on convex or
on concave counting functions. These two classes of rules are different in some interesting way. On
the one hand, top-k-counting rules based on convex counting functions are fixed-majority consistent,
but seem very hard to compute (with a few exceptions). On the other hand, top-k-counting rules
based on concave counting functions fail the fixed-majority criterion (the borderline case of Bloc
rule excluded), but are much easier to compute (typically still NP-hard, but with constant-factor
polynomial-time approximation algorithms and FPT algorithms for the parameterization by the
number of voters).
Our work leads to a number of open questions. In the axiomatic direction, it would be interesting
to provide a characterization of committee scoring rules along the lines of Young’s characterization
for their single-winner counterparts [You75]. On the computational front, it would be interesting
to find more powerful algorithms for computing winning committees under various top-k-counting
rules (e.g., for the αk-PAV rule).
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